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I. Introduction  
In this paper we attempt to take a fresh look at the classical question of the determinants of tax 
effort. Our goal is to better understand the fundamental economic logic of the different 
approaches that have been used in the previous literature, consider alternative measurements 
which may provide a more direct intuition of what the concept of tax effort attempts to measure, 
and to compare quantitatively the rankings of tax effort produced by all these different 
approaches. As we see it, the fundamental issue is how to move forward toward a definition of 
tax effort that has a higher relevance to the developmental needs and budgetary ambitions of a 
country and as an indicator of potential tax reform needs. Fundamentally, all tax effort indicators 
are calculated by comparing actual collection performance against a measure of potential 
collections. This definitional choice lays out several dimensions for the conduct of tax policy in a 
country. These include the need for reform to raise revenues with reference to some potential, the  
desirable timing and urgency of those reforms, and the extent of the gains in national welfare that 
are achievable with these reforms. While the first two dimensions have been examined in 
different ways in the previous literature, in this paper, for the first time in this literature, we will 
examine how much the two different approaches to estimation of tax effort matter as compared 
to those conventionally used. In addition, and also for the first time in this literature, in this paper 
we argue for the need to explicitly link the adequacy of tax effort with the specific expenditure 
goals of government and their associated gains in national welfare.  
Developing countries have often clearly defined service delivery and development outcome gaps. 
A number of international reports highlight who is lagging behind global trends and by how 
much.
1
 These comparative statistics are often used to serve as motivations for focusing attention 
on the development needs in different countries, to spur action on specific reforms or to gather 
support for particular programs. These discussions very often correctly point out the gaps in 
development needs. But much less often the discussions clearly identify how much financing is 
available to a country to bridge the existing budget gaps. In developing countries, foreign aid and 
national tax effort together bring the resources up to cover budgetary needs. The national tax 
effort is something the countries can change through tax reform but without referring to 
development needs or ‘desirable revenue potential’; by how much and within what time frame 
                                                          
1
 For example, to name two of the most influential sources of this information: UNDP Human Development Reports 
annualized since 1990; World Bank’s World Development Reports annualized series since 1978.  
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the tax effort should be changed is often left unclear. A number of considerations are relevant to 
these key questions. These include whether tax effort is an outcome of the structural features of 
the economy largely outside the immediate control of the government or is it simply a result of 
administrative inputs much more under control of government; whether taxation levels indicate 
collective preferences for public goods or they are hampered by endemic corruption which seeps 
away resources; or whether institutional features of the country matter more than anything else. 
All these issues have been debated in the literature for several decades. The vibrant debate on the 
determinants of tax effort indicates not only its critical importance to development but also the 
complex nature of the issue.  
Clearly the way tax effort is calculated is affected by the choice of the measure of revenue 
potential, the denominator of any tax effort indicator.  Thus one way to research the tax effort 
concept is to see how the revenue potential benchmark or desired tax capacity is estimated. In 
this paper, we develop this discussion by comparing three different ways to estimate tax 
potential, and therefore tax effort. Each case has certain strengths and weaknesses. Through this 
discussion we aim to extend the literature by organizing the search for a tax potential estimate in 
an integrated manner. We also make a mention of some additional ways in which tax potential, 
and thus tax effort, could be estimated.  
This paper contributes to the discussion on tax effort in two other relatively less significant but 
noteworthy ways. First, one of the approaches we examine in depth is the stochastic frontier 
analysis model. This econometric tool generates a measure of tax capacity which is specific to 
each country while the performance benchmark arises out of the experience with general tax 
effort across countries. Using a wider range of explanatory variables our analysis provides 
improved estimates vis-à-vis the previous literature. Second, the model allows estimation of 
time-varying inefficiency in tax effort. In our analysis we attempt to estimate the effects of 
various institutional factors on this inefficiency thus delineating a clearer agenda for 
comprehensive tax reforms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly recount in Section 2 the 
importance of calculating tax effort, not only accurately but cogently, to tax policy and reform 
discussions. In Section 3, we discuss three ways in which tax effort can be calculated for 
different countries using different benchmarks for tax capacity or desirable levels of revenue. 
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Then in Section 4, we recount the methodology for estimating tax effort using the traditional and 
stochastic frontier analysis approaches. In addition, we also identify several other ways in which 
tax capacity and effort could be calculated. Section 5 contains a discussion of the estimation 
results. In Section 6, we provide an explanation of a new measure of tax potential and therefore 
tax effort and draw a comparison between tax efforts calculated by using three different methods. 
Section 7 concludes the discussion laying out directions for further work.  
 
II. The Importance of Calculating Tax Effort Correctly  
How much tax revenue needs to be raised in any particular country is fundamentally the result of 
a collective choice decision on the desired level of public expenditures. Collective preferences 
for public goods and services, desired level of social protection and insurance and economic 
wealth, in turn, are the main determinants of the desired level of public expenditures. There is, 
therefore, no normative theory of desired revenues applicable to all countries. Among developed 
countries it is perfectly anticipated to find marked differences in the share of GDP that is 
collected in taxes (for example, Sweden and the United States). On the other hand, there is a 
commonly accepted stand that lagging economic development can be interpreted as an almost 
obvious need for more public revenues. Developing countries with lagging indicators in health, 
education, public infrastructure and regulatory services are commonly perceived to be in need of 
higher public spending to meet short term population needs as well as to put the country on a 
longer term development trajectory. The recent UNDP rankings for Human Development Index 
show that some countries lag behind others by a magnitude of 3 fold in health and education 
outcomes.
2
 Finding sustainable financing is a key to bridging these gaps and harnessing the 
human potential in these societies. This brings up tax effort as a central concern for policy.  
Tax effort, the ratio between actual tax collection and potential tax or revenue, serves as an 
effective indicator and point of departure for tax reforms and as an enduring indicator of the 
sufficiency of government revenues. From this perspective tax effort is a useful tool to motivate 
policy discussions on how much additional endeavor a country needs to make for meeting its 
development objectives. Only when governments are raising sufficient revenue can they pursue 
                                                          
2
 UNDP’s 2011 Human Development Report shows that Democratic Republic of Congo has achieved a human 
development index of 0.286 while Norway has ranked a high 0.943.  
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enhancing access and quality of services for the people. Within the development policy, poverty 
reduction is a key objective that has shaped many developing country plans in the past decades 
(Pirttilä and Tuomala, 2004). In addition, donor policies in many countries have required poverty 
reduction strategies to be developed and adopted as formal statements and serve as devices to 
monitor progress. All these policy options lay down expenditure levels, which, in turn require 
commensurate revenue.
3
 On the other hand, growth promotion policies also consider tax effort as 
an important indicator but from a different perspective. How much income should be left for 
private allocation is often at the center of growth and development policies together with what 
type of taxes should be used to collect revenue (Arnold et al., 2011). High taxation means less 
income for private consumption and investment. More importantly, a bad tax system is likely to 
stifle growth (Bird, 2010) and be accompanied by some negative effects on local economic 
activity and job creation.
4
 Of course, the level of taxation and even the types of taxes used in a 
country are linked to the level of development (Bahl and Bird, 2008). However, while this 
relationship is apparent, it is noteworthy that it is less clearly understood how they affect each 
other.  
The manner in which tax effort is calculated, however, becomes as important as the reported 
ratio itself. A country with high preference for public goods, and therefore public expenditure, 
may need a higher level of revenues. Social norms may influence tax collection as well as level 
of taxes (Konrad and Qari, 2012).
5
 The quality of public expenditure also influences citizens’ 
choices.
6
 Inefficiency in converting public expenditure inputs into consumption would intuitively 
lower the value of such expenditure in the eyes of the citizens.
7
 On the other hand an inverse 
comparator may have a very low preference for public goods where the people dictate choices of 
                                                          
3
 This discussion is often captured by fiscal response models tracing the effects of foreign aid on tax effort (for 
examples,Franco-Rodriguez,2000 and McGillivray and Ouattara,2003) or by linking foreign aid with poverty 
reduction targets as an autonomous source of revenue (Agenor, Bayraktar and Aynaoui, 2008).  
4
 In the U.S. context,  Wasylenko (1997) points out that some studies report negative tax elasticity estimates which 
means that the states with higher tax rates will lose economic activity to other regions and may also have a slower 
job creation.   
5
 Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009) modeling the case of Spain show that when political change leads to social 
norms change this can result in an overall increase in the level of taxation.  
6
 Barone and Moceti (2011) arguing that the efficiency of public expenditures contributes to tax morale show that 
the quality of public expenditures can be seen as another factor that will in turn determine how much will be 
collected in taxes.  
7
 The notion of this inefficiency and how it may affect GDP estimates is discussed in Grigoli and Ley (2012). 




 Consequently, in such a country the required level of revenue will be 
lower. This notion demands that tax effort measures should take into account the collective 
preference for public goods and the interdependence of preferences for public expenditures and 
taxes.
9
 If democratically expressed collective preferences for a certain level of public 
expenditure result in a certain level of tax effort there is not much point in generating a policy 
debate about increasing efforts to collect additional revenues. It is this intimate connection 
between country specific development objectives and the measures of potential tax revenue and 
actual collections that forms the main basis for the discussion of tax effort measures.  
It can be argued that the collective preference for public goods in a country should have a mirror 
image in the level of taxation. It is intuitively appealing to argue that a country decides to 
provide a certain level of public goods and then goes about raising a matching level of revenue. 
In practice, that true reflection of collective preference for public expenditure seen through the 
revenue effort may be hobbled by political factors in a country. There are cases where tax effort 
in a country has stagnated over time (for example, Martinez-Vazquez, 2001 for the case of 
Mexico; Martinez-Vazquez, 2007 in the case of Pakistan). This could be a combination of tax 
policy and administration settling into some sort of an equilibrium which is quite divorced from 
what appears to be the collectively preferred level of public expenditures. In addition, the quality 
of political institutions is reflected in the level of tax effort with interest groups vying with each 
other for influencing public policy in general and tax policy in particular. The level of taxation 
therefore must be seen as a direct outcome of highly contested political and rent-seeking 
processes, with notions of equitable access to services, allocative efficiency, and size of 
government impinging upon the final outcomes.  
 
Political choices in a country materialize in the shape and level of taxation but those may not be 
the only forces at play. Tax administration, its functionality and effectiveness are also 
determined by politics. What may not be achievable by tax policy transparently is sometimes 
possible through tax administration opaquely. Thus political redistribution may be achieved 
through differential application of administration (Esteller-Moré, 2012).  Tax policy may treat 
                                                          
8
 For example Neustadt and Zweifel (2010) report differences in willingness to pay and size of the Swiss welfare 
state resulting in pressures on the latter.  
9
 See Bierbrauer and Sahm (2010) for theoretical discussion of this issue.  
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different groups according to notions of equity. But tax administration may favor some groups 
by paying less attention to them. In Pakistan, for example, small traders comprise a formidable 
political group. Tax policy levies a sales tax on retail business transactions but lack of 
enforcement allows small businesses to evade the tax. This is an apparent loophole in the tax 
system. Governments in the last two decades have struggled periodically to enforce 
documentation of retail transactions and to follow through with collection. However, each time 
public protests were launched by small businesses forcing the governments to abandon efforts 
and allowing the status quo to continue. In other words, to provide a dispensation which, 
although not legislated in tax policy, is de facto provided through tax administration.   
 
Between the traditional approach to estimating tax effort focused on the presence of tax handles 
starting with the work of Lotz and Morss (1970) and Bahl (1971) and the later work like Bird, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2008), there has been an attempt to unravel the largely 
subliminal political agreements, organizational culture and social features of tax systems. 
Estimating tax effort by taking into account the political and institutional dimensions of a 
country starts to cater to less visible constraints on tax systems. We now clearly understand that 
the political equilibrium in a society affects the level of taxation.
10
 This is important from several 
perspectives. First of all, tax gaps generated by comparing country collections with international 
average may serve as a good entry point for discussions on tax policy but they may not provide a 
plan for reform. Deeper understanding of local tax systems is required to create tax reform 
packages with specific country relevance. Second, tax reform may seek to reset the political 
balance achieved between competing interests in the past. If this plays out on the sidelines of 
reform implementation, it may affect the reform outcomes without the main issues ever coming 
into proper focus. If this threat is recognized and discussed in the reform process, its adverse 
effects may be curtailed. Third, tax reform that suits a particular context has higher probability of 
success. The standard tax advice must be tailored to address particular situations, keeping in 
view the feasibility of reform actions. Fourth, institutional characteristics in a country may be of 
two types. First, some social or cultural characteristics are hard to change in the short run. These 
must be recognized so to adopt mitigation strategies for enhancing the success of reforms. 
                                                          
10
 See, for example, Ehrhart (2011) who finds a positive relationship between democracy and tax collection in a 
panel of 66 developing countries for the period 1990-2005.  
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Second, organizational characteristics and tax morale, on the other hand, are not set in stone. 
Reforms that aim to address the contextual variables that define the environment in which taxes 
are levied, paid and collected are again likely to be more successful than those which pay scant 
attention to them.  
The quality of governance is also likely to affect tax effort. This is based on the assumption that 
if corruption is rife and trust in public authority is low then citizens would not support higher 
levels of taxation. An inefficient public expenditure system converts taxes into public services at 
higher costs.  Often, the failure of the state to provide adequate public services leads to citizens 
opting for privately provided service substitutes. When this happens, citizens are likely to 
support even lower levels of taxation.  
 
III. Three Approaches to Calculating Tax Effort  
Several approaches can be used to determine tax effort for individual countries, and they differ 
fundamentally by the way in which the key variable of potential tax revenue is calculated.  
In the first approach, which for lack of a better name we will call the traditional regression 
approach, tax effort is measured by comparing actual tax collection as a percentage of potential 
tax revenues. That revenue potential is generated from the predicted values based on regression 
analysis. Some early contributions to this discussion were Bahl (1971) and Lotz and Morss 
(1970). Later on, Leuthold (1991), Tanzi (1992), Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Ghura 
(1998), Piancastelli (2001), Eltony (2002), and Gupta (2007) have contributed empirical studies 
using this approach. The advantage of this approach lies in its simplicity. Data on the dependent 
variables are easily available and the estimation models do not impose much structure on the 
estimation parameters. By adding various economic features related to the tax bases and their 
relative accessibility to the tax administration authorities, this approach takes into consideration 
structural economic features that are likely to affect tax effort. In an international cross country 
setting, this approach to calculating tax effort serves a useful purpose of providing comparisons 
on the size of government revenue across countries conditional on economic structure and other 
determinants of taxable bases.  
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For policy advice, tax effort determined in this manner serves a useful but limited purpose. The 
traditional approach yields an indicator that is clear but that generally has important limitations 
to inform policy reform.. An exception to this may be when the introduction or not of a particular 
tax instrument can be used to explain variations in tax effort. 
11
  
From a specific country perspective, the traditional regression approach does not provide a 
yardstick of expected revenues but generates a notional value of revenue potential if a number of 
estimated parameters were to follow the same pattern in that  particular country. In particular, the 
standard estimated equation characterized by tax handles representing structural features of the 
economy does not provide much guidance to governments eager to increase their revenue. The 
structural features are often not amenable to change over the short run as a result of government 
policy measures.
12
 For instance, if an economy has a large agrarian base and this shows up as a 
major determinant of low tax effort, it only indicates that tax effort may not change for many 
years to come thus diminishing government’s enthusiasm for reform.  
As an extension of the traditional approach, the role of institutions can be added to the list of 
determinants of tax effort. (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2008). Beyond the traditional 
tax handles, the level of revenue a government is able to collect may be constrained (facilitated) 
by the quality of public services, governance and state institutions.
 13
 Whereas the first two 
contribute to tax morale, the quality of institutions may have both a direct and an indirect effect 
on tax collections. Institutions may lack capacity to collect revenue. Where outdated systems 
form the bedrock of tax administration, it is hard to collect higher revenue as documentation may 
be insufficient, records may not be up to date or disaggregated record keeping may result in loss 
of information. The cost of administration is high and this may result in ab initio high 
expenditures on reform measures to raise more revenue. For tax reform purposes, this choice sets 
up a tradeoff between current consumption, which is politically insistent, and future tax revenues 
to be realized over time (Cárdenas and Tuzemen, 2011). Fiscally constrained governments may 
                                                          
11
 Keen and Lockwood (2010) use VAT as an explanatory variable in the tax effort equation to determine its impact 
on changes in revenue mobilization.  
12
 Features of industrial organization in a country may also be deemed to affect tax collections (Kleven, Kreiner and 
Saez, 2009) but they may be equally hard to change, especially in the short run. 
13
 There is a wide range of other institutional variables that have been examined for their potential to affect tax 
collection levels.  Aizenman and Jinjarak (2012) derive results to show that inequality has a negative effect on tax 
base in a country; Elgin et al., (2012) argue that religion influences private charitable donations as a substitute to 
taxes.  
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not be able to adopt long term costly options. Indirectly, the quality of institutions again affects 
tax morale and creates opportunities of collusion between tax collectors and tax payers.  The 
additional analytic dimensions of the traditional approach can provide more relevant guidance to 
governments aiming to enhance their tax effort since it offers some entry points for policy reform 
in the short run.   
More recently several papers have used stochastic frontier analysis to compute tax effort and for 
taking a stab at formally identifying the determinants of inefficiency in tax collections (Alfirman, 
2003; and Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010). The analysis is conducted into two stages. In the first 
stage, stochastic frontier analysis is used to model tax effort while in the second stage, factors 
influencing the time-varying inefficiency in tax effort are identified. This approach has the 
advantage of identifying weak areas of administration and institutional environment. These 
sources of time-varying inefficiency are generally important to tax reform and typically are more 
amenable to reform measures than structural variables over shorter spans of time.  
The sources of inefficiency in tax effort have been discussed in a number of papers (Pitt and Lee, 
1981; Battese, 1992; and Battese and Coelli, 1992). Corruption is seen as an important factor that 
decreases tax collection and can add rents to formally paid taxes.
14
  More generally, corruption 
may vitiate efforts at increasing taxes in two ways. First, corruption is an unobserved charge on 
tax payments resulting in a higher effective tax on taxpayers than what is estimable from the 
public accounts. Attempts at increases in taxes are likely to be met with more resistance and 
higher evasion. Second, corruption payments do not contribute to the financing of public goods 
and services. They are rents siphoned away for private consumption. If higher taxes lead to 
higher rates of corruption, taxpayers will attempt to evade even more. Third, corruption is a 
result of the bargaining position granted to tax collectors by tax policy decisions. Higher tax rates 
increase tax collectors’ bargaining position allowing them to collect higher rents from taxpayers.  
Tax gaps result from both tax policy decisions and administration and compliance 
implementation. Exemptions and other elements of the tax structure are part of the first 
component of the gaps, whereas corruption and evasion are part of the  second component.  
                                                          
14
 Corruption may lower the burden of corporate taxes (Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang, 2011); on the 
other hand, it is sometimes argued to be a marginal tax for businesses (Olken and Pande, 2011).  
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While recognizing the dual sources of gaps, the revenue losses from tax exemptions and the like 
are much more difficult to account for in cross-country analysis.  
For ascertaining the value of the traditional and stochastic frontier approaches of calculating tax 
effort to tax policy discussion it is useful to focus on the creation of the counterfactual revenue or 
tax potential measure. The traditional regression approach creates a counterfactual for the 
measure of tax potential that is the predicted value for each country from the estimated equation 
for entire sample of countries. In other words, the measure of tax capacity for each country is 
generated by using parameters based on cross-country data but allowing for individual country 
characteristics as given by the level of the variables used in the estimation equation.  
 The stochastic frontier analysis develops a function that expresses the maximum amount of 
revenue that countries could collect from given bundles of determinant characteristics of 
revenues, and allows us to estimate technical inefficiency in a country’s revenue collection and 
then investigate factors determining technical inefficiency in the country’s tax system. The 
possibility frontier of taxation is the highest level of taxation feasible under the given country 
conditions. It estimates a measure of tax capacity in the country given its economic, institutional, 
social and population features. It takes into account the national income, tax handles, tax 
administration and preference for public goods. There are some advantages to estimating tax 
effort and collection inefficiency as a two-step process. The first step clearly lays out a model 
where the production possibility frontier of taxation is clearly established. The second step 
provides a measure of time varying inefficiency in tax collections. This is a function of both tax 
policy and administration. As a second step, different institutional and administrative variables 
can be analyzed as determinants of the measure of inefficiency. 
As we discuss below, the estimated tax effort from the traditional approach and the stochastic 
frontier analysis are highly correlated. This result indicates that the two methods are quite 
substitutable. Thus, the advantage of the stochastic frontier approach may simply lie in having a 
more transparent interpretation of specific institutional constraints to tax effort in a country.  
On the other hand, both the traditional and stochastic frontier approaches are limited in that they 
do not generate country specific measures of tax potential that are cogent to national policy. 
Using data from other countries to estimate tax potential introduces noise through unobserved 
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factors not the least of which are the collective preferences for public goods and services and 
general cultural attitudes toward the role of the public sector.
15
 An alternative approach to 
estimating tax effort is to look at the deviations between what a country would like to raise in tax 
revenues – as revealed by the persistent (or structural) choice of the level of public 
expenditures—and its actual tax collections. Invoking Ricardian equivalence it should be 
possible to argue that taxpayers see the current deficit as future taxes. Therefore, the deficit is a 
measure of the discrepancy between the desired level of taxation (or preferred level of public 
expenditures) and the current level of taxation for each particular country. This approach has the 
advantage of assessing tax effort while accommodating preferences for size of government in a 
country. Under this approach therefore we would use the actual level of public expenditures (or 
some moving average of that variable) as an indicator of desired level of taxation in a country, 
revealed through the political process.
16
 This method is closely related to the revenue adequacy 
approach which relates the overall balance between expenditures and revenues (Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab, 2000) and it is consistent with the empirical evidence that changes in 
expenditures appear to lead to changes in tax levels (Baicker and Skinner, 2011). As we indicate, 
developing this approach is a veritable research agenda and something we highlight to be 
important for generating a higher relevance for tax policy discussions for policy makers.  
Selecting the (persistent or structural) level of expenditures observed in a country as a 
benchmark for the desired level of taxation suggests that there are several other possibilities for 
the selection of the benchmark. For example, one such benchmark for revenue effort could be the 
average expenditure levels (adjusted for population and so on) of other countries in the region of 
similar income levels. This approach would seem to be the one implicitly used in public 
expenditure reviews by the World Bank and other multilateral finance institutions when they 
compare the performance in education, health, infrastructure and so on of a country to those in 
other similar countries in the region. A similar benchmark could be constructed by deriving the 
level of expenditures required in a country to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG). In the empirical work in the next section we will only consider the (persistent or 
                                                          
15
 In the empirical section below we address some of these issues by using fixed effects estimation. 
16 Mahdavi (2008) alludes to actual tax to GDP ratio as a function of the desired level of tax ratio but does not 
develop the concept further. The empirical analysis focuses on the standard determinants of tax level, and public 
debt and foreign aid and other control variables. Due to substitution, the desired level of tax ratio drops out of the 
model.  
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structural) level of expenditures observed in a country as a benchmark for the desired level of 
taxation as the alternative to the tax effort measures derived from the traditional approach and 
stochastic frontier approach. 
 
IV. Alternative Estimations of Revenue Effort 
To estimate revenue effort under the different methodologies discussed in the previous section 
we employ a panel data set comprising a sample of 94 countries over the period 1970-2009. Our 
main goal in this section is to compare the performance of the three approaches discussed in the 
previous section, and in particular determine to what extent the different approaches deliver 
different scores for tax effort.  
We start with the so-called traditional regression approach for which the benchmark for potential 
revenues in the tax effort ratio is derived from the predicted revenues based on a fixed effects 
model, which has been traditionally used in the literature. The traditional method is augmented 
by including institutional factors that can potentially affect tax effort. 
Our second approach is known as the stochastic frontier approach, which develops in the first 
stage a function that expresses the maximum amount of revenues that countries could collect 
given several bundles of determinant characteristics of revenues. In a second stage, this analysis 
also allows us to investigate what factors may be responsible for explaining the observed 
technical inefficiency in a country’s tax collection system. For the third approach, we calculate 
countries’ revenue effort based on their expenditures.  
Finally, we will compare three estimates of revenue effort and analyze the correlation between 
them. Note that in all the estimations we will use total revenues in place of tax revenues for 
reasons of definitional simplicity in our data. We are led by the assumption that most so-called non-
tax revenues could be easily transformed via legal definitions in tax revenues. Under this approach we 
also avoid the noise introduced in the tax revenue data by how different countries decide to tax or collect 




                                                          
17
 Only a few papers on tax effort discuss this issue. For example, Mahadavi (2008) uses non-tax revenue as a 
determinant of tax revenue, arguing that it works as a substitute to tax collections. Other papers have shown that 
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Predicting Potential Revenues 
A. The Traditional (Fixed Effects) Regression Approach 
As we explained above, we firstly apply the traditional regression approach for predicting 
countries’ potential revenues. In this case we estimate the function            using the 
traditional fixed effects method. The basic model can be expressed as  
       
 
   
                    
    is the unknown intercept for each country which is time-invariant, while    changes over time 
but not across countries.     is a matrix of variables that we consider as important factors 
affecting countries’ potential revenue collection. We discuss the determinants of potential 
revenues below. A significant difference between the traditional approach and the stochastic 
frontier approach is the assumption made about the random error,    . In the case of the 
traditional approach this is a two-sided normally distributed error while in the case of the 
stochastic frontier model the error is assumed to be one-sided. Thus in the case of the stochastic 
frontier approach a country can only deviate from the optimal by underperforming in its tax 
administration while in the case of the traditional approach a country can deviate from the 
expected average by both overperforming or underperforming. 
 
B. Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
We now move to the Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Stochastic frontier models became a popular 
subfield in econometrics after they were first introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) 
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).  
 
In a world where there is no inefficiency, tax administration in country i collects tax revenues 
          . Stochastic frontier analysis, however, assumes that tax administration potentially 
collects less revenue than it might due to a degree of inefficiency, that is 
 
              
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
higher non-tax revenue in developing countries (for example, from natural resources) is correlated with lower tax 
revenue. This issue is related to the study of revenue structure or mix.  
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where          is the level of inefficiency in its revenue collection. If     , the tax 
administration is collecting the optimal amount of tax revenues, using the available inputs    
defining the tax bases, and the production function        . When     , the tax administration 
is not making the most of the available inputs   . Since tax collection    is assumed to be strictly 
positive       , the degree of technical inefficiency is also assumed to be strictly positive 
      . 
 
Tax revenue collection    is also assumed to be subject to random shocks, implying that 
                            
Taking the natural log of equation     yields 
                                    
Assuming that function         is linear in logs, that there are   inputs defining the country’s 
tax bases, and defining            yields 
              
 
   
                       
where    represents a ratio of total revenues (sum of tax and non-tax revenues) to GDP, while     
represents a matrix of variables affecting the country’s potential revenues. Moreover, to account 
for countries’ fixed effects, we include a set of country and year dummies.  
 
We assume that the idiosyncratic error component,   , is independently         distributed over 
the observations. Since         , it implies that          and, therefore,     . In other 
words, the inefficiency effect    lowers the tax collection from its potential level. We assume 
two alternative specifications of the inefficiency term,   . In the first one, the    is independently 
half-normally        
   distributed, and in the second one, the    is independently 
exponentially distributed with variance,   
 . 
 
Revenue potential variables 
When identifying determinants of countries’ revenue potential that can be derived from the 
stochastic frontier regression analysis, we are led by the hypothesis that a country’s revenue 
capacity depends on economic, demographic and institutional factors. As economic factors we 
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include GDP per capita, openness, shares of hard-to-tax sectors in GDP (agriculture, services, 
and construction), inflation rate, income inequality, capital investments, foreign grants, and crude 
petrol production. Among demographic variables we identify age dependency, population 
density, and level of education. Finally, to account for the country’s institutional setting, we 
include corruption level as an additional determinant. 
 
Economic Factors  
GDP per capita is one of the variables that are most commonly used in the tax effort literature as 
a proxy for economic development. One would expect a positive relationship between GDP per 
capital and revenue collection because of higher ability to pay in a society with higher income 
(Bahl, 1971; Fox and Gurley, 2005).  
 
As a measure of trade flows serving as a tax handle, Openness is measured by the KOF’s 
Globalization Index, which incorporates three major dimensions of globalization; namely, 
economic, social and political globalization.
18
 The effect of globalization on revenue 
mobilization is ambiguous. On the one hand, greater mobility of goods and factors of production 
largely represents increased mobility of the tax base, and hence, potentially reduces revenues 
(Keen and Mansour, 2010). On the other hand, since imports and exports take place at specific 
locations generally few in numbers in a country, they are relatively easy to tax, leading to larger 
revenues (Alonso and Garcimartin, 2011).  
 
Similarly, the effect of inflation on the tax revenues is ambiguous. On the one hand, due to the 
Oliveira-Tanzi effect (Oliveira, 1967; Tanzi, 1977), hyperinflation decreases real value of tax 
revenues due to the lags between tax liabilities and the actual collection of the taxes. Moreover, 
certain types of taxes, such as excise duties, that are levied at specific rates may not be properly 
indexed, in which case high inflation leads to a reduction in their real value (Easterly and 
Schmidt-Hebbe, 1991). On the other hand, inflation may increase revenues in progressive tax 
systems if the tax rates are indexed with a significant lag (Alonso and Garcimartin (2011). 
 
                                                          
18
 The reason that we use this measure of globalization rather than the ratio of trade (sum of exports and imports) 
and GDP is that the latter does not take into account other important factors affecting trade openness, such as trade 
policy and country’s economic, social, and political characteristics, which the KOF’s index does take into account. 
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Another important determinant of a country’s ability to collect taxes is the sectoral structure of 
the economy. Certain sectors in the economy have been traditionally hard to tax, such as 
agriculture, services, and construction. Because of that and other reasons (equity and political 
economy issues), many countries exempt agriculture from taxes. A similar case can be made for 
many services. The construction section in most countries has a high percentage of output 
produced informally and therefore hard to reach by tax administrations (Jewell et al., 2005). 
Therefore, the larger the share of these sectors in GDP, the more difficult it will be for tax 
administrations to collect revenues. 
 
The income inequality variable is measured by the Gini coefficient, which represents the extent 
to which the distribution of individual income or consumption within a country deviates from an 
equal distribution. Income distribution has been rarely used as a determinant of revenue effort, 
with the exception of just a few studies such as Bird et al. (2004), Gupta (2007), Pessino and 
Fenochietto (2010), and Alonso and Garcimartin (2011). All these studies find that income 
inequality has a negative effect on revenue collections. It is considered that increasing income 
inequality reduces the tax base through more than one channel. For example, in a more unequal 
society, the administration mostly depends on the higher income groups for revenue collection, 
which reduces the tax base. Gupta (2007) uses tax structure (direct versus indirect taxes) as a 
proxy for income distribution and argues that since indirect taxes tend to be regressive, they 
increase income inequality and reduce the tax base. Similarly, as Alonso and Garcimartin (2011) 
point out, higher income inequality may lead to a larger informal sector which hinders tax 
collection. Furthermore, a political economy argument can be made that income inequality also 
represents concentrated but powerful interests in society which may not be easily amenable to 
paying higher taxes.  
 
Capital investment, measured by the gross fixed capital formation, is expected to have a positive 
effect on government revenues through the potential expansion of economic activity and tax 
bases. On the other hand, resource-rich countries may exert lower tax effort than their resource-
scarce counterparts because of either incentives caused by the wealth from natural resources, or 
because of the lack of capacity to fully utilize their revenue potential (Ndikumana and 
Abderrahim, 2010). We employ domestic crude petrol production as a proxy for a country’s 
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natural resource endowment. Similarly, grants received from foreign governments and 
international organizations may give governments an incentive to reduce their tax effort (Gupta 
et al., 2003). 
 
Demographic Factors 
Demographics can also play a significant role in determining a country’s tax base and effort.  
Age dependency, measured as the ratio of dependents (the population under age 15 and above 
age 65) to the working-age population (those aged 15-64), is expected to have a negative effect 
on the tax base (Minh Le et al., 2008). Another demographic component is population density, 
whose effect on the revenue potential and revenue effort is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher 
concentration of people should make taxation easier. On the other hand, larger population 
density may also encourage informal activities that are difficult to tax (Mkandawire, 2010). 
Because people live closer to each other, information transactions become more feasible which 
in turn tends to reduce revenue collection (Kau and Rubin, 1981). 
 
The level of education, measured by the UN’s Education Index, has been frequently used as 
another important demographic component of a country’s revenue capacity. The effect of 
education is also ambiguous. On the one hand, the more educated people are the better they can 
understand the relationship between public goods provision and the importance of paying taxes 
to finance them (Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010). On the other side, the more educated people are 
the more knowledgeable they become regarding how to avoid paying taxes, in which case we 
would expect a negative effect of education on revenue collection. 
 
Institutional Factors 
The previous empirical evidence shows that a high level of corruption reduces revenues 
collection (Abed and Gupta, 2002). Bird et al. (2008) have also found that taxpayers who deal 
with rampant corruption are less willing to pay taxes. Corruption also discourages foreign 
investment, which negatively affects economic activity and the tax base. We measure corruption 
with the ICRG’s assessment of corruption in the political system. The index ranges from 1 to 6, 
where a higher number means a lower risk of corruption. 
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Finally, given that our dependent variable is preferably observed at the general government level 
whenever possible, and at the central government level when the data at the general government 
level are not available, we include a dummy that equals 1 if the revenues are observed at the 
general government level, and zero otherwise. This allows us to cater to the effects of budget 
classification in our empirical results.  
  
 
Explaining Technical Inefficiency 
As we mentioned above, the stochastic frontier analysis allows us to estimate the level of 
technical inefficiency and its determinants in countries’ revenue collection systems.  
 
Basically, after estimating equation (4) 
              
 
   
                 
we predict the technical inefficiency term,    , and then we estimate the following equation 
       
 
   
                    
where     represents a set of variables that may explain technical inefficiency in revenue 
collection, including corruption, complexity of the tax system, tax morale, years in office of the 
chief executive, political fractionalization, population growth, government debt level, and 
changes in the monetary base.     is the unobserved individual country effect, while    is the 
time effect. 
 
It is not clear whether corruption is only an input variable determining potential revenue 
collection by reducing the tax base, or it is also the determinant of technical inefficiency. That is 
why we also include corruption in the inefficiency equation. Corruption may increase technical 
inefficiency in the tax system by introducing permanent instability in the political system. Since 
our variable represents the risk of corruption, with larger values meaning lower risk, we expect a 
negative relationship between this variable and technical inefficiency. 
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After Wagner’s (1976) findings strongly supported the hypothesis that the complexity of the tax 
system affects public expenditures and revenues, there were many studies that tested this 




 This hypothesis states that the simpler the 
tax system, the easier it is for the taxpayers (and voters) to perceive the real cost of government, 
and it is more likely that the government would have smaller expenditures and, therefore, smaller 
revenues. In other words, more complex tax systems lead to larger government, greater 
expenditures and, therefore, greater revenues for their financing, and in turn, more efficiency in 
revenue collection. We measure tax complexity by the Herfindahl Index of a country’s revenue 
system,
21
 but we acknowledge that it is far from being a perfect measure of tax complexity given 
that it assumes that all taxes have the same level of progressivity and equally affect taxpayers’ 
incentives.  
 
Tax morale, measured by the percentage of the population who declare cheating on taxes as 
never justifiable, is another variable for which it is not very clear whether it should be an input to 
the collection process or, instead, a determinant of technical inefficiency. Since higher tax 
morale makes it easier for the government to collect taxes, it could be interpreted to be an input 
contributing to the larger tax base. However, in high-tax-morale societies, tax administration 
may be more relaxed in collecting taxes and have lower audit rates (and therefore, all other 
things equal, be relatively more inefficient in extracting revenue for a given tax base), which 
may give way to higher tax evasion. We try to estimate equation (4) by including tax morale as 
another explanatory variable, but due to a relatively small number of observations, our sample is 
reduced 50 percent of its size and allows us to predict potential revenues for just a few countries. 
Therefore, we include tax morale only in the technical inefficiency equation while its sign may 
depend upon the mechanism through which it affects tax effort. 
 
Democracies tend to have more efficient tax systems (Aizenman and Noy, 2004) and greater 
fractionalization in the government is interpreted to mean better representation of citizens and 
more efficient provision of services. Moreover, fractionalized governments might contribute to 
                                                          
19
 See for example Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), Baker (1983), Breeden and Hunter (1985), Cullis and Jones 
(1987), and Heyndels and Smolders (1995). 
20
 See for example Clotfelter (1976), Munley and Greene (1978), Misiolek and Elder (1988), and Henrekson (1988). 
21
 We use different types of taxes to compute the Herfindahl Index. See the Appendix for details. 
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political stability by being less able to make comprehensive reforms (Bjornskov et al., 2006). 
The variable political fractionalization represents the probability that two deputies from among 
the government parties picked at random would be of different parties.  
 
Population growth rate is associated with higher inefficiency in the tax system because it is 
difficult to administer a rapidly rising populations of taxpayers (Minh Le et al. 2008). On the 
other hand, while higher levels of government debt 
22
may have a positive effect on government 
efficiency in collecting taxes because it will need to repay the debt in the future (Barro, 1974), 
seignorage revenues, proxied by increases in the monetary base, may discourage governments 
from collecting taxes (Cukierman et al., 1992). To account for a lag in the effect of debt on 




Finally, we include a dummy for general government to distinguish between inefficiency 
measured at the general government level from the one measured only at the central government 
level, and we also include a dummy for the OECD countries, allowing for a structural shift 
between developed and developing countries. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
A. Fixed Effects 
We start the discussion with the results obtained from the estimation of equation (1) using the 
fixed effects model. Table 1 presents alternative specifications for estimating potential revenues 
by using this methodology. As can be observed, unlike Stochastic Frontier Analysis where in the 
first stage we include only those variables potentially affecting the tax base, in the traditional 
approach we also include the institutional variables.  In addition to a different estimation method, 
in this case we do not log- transform any of the variables in the model. As we can see in Table 1, 
the estimated coefficients mostly have the expected signs and are statistically significant.  
  
                                                          
22
 Government debt refers to the gross general government debt, whenever data are available. However, when 
general government data were not available, only central government debt was observed. See the Appendix for a full 
description of the variable and data sources.  
23
 We experiment with different lags of government debt and observe no significant difference in the results. 
Therefore, we observe only its one year lagged value.  
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Table 1. Determinants of Potential Revenues, Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Income Inequality -0.279*** -0.288*** -0.291*** -0.254*** -0.284*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.040) (0.038) 
Globalization 0.108*** 0.098*** 0.079*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.033) 
Age Dependency 0.022 0.023 -0.079*** 0.021 0.048 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.030) (0.032) 
Agriculture -0.297*** -0.296*** 0.077 -0.289*** -0.292*** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) 
Services -0.147*** -0.142*** 0.022 -0.145*** -0.142*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) 
Construction -0.848*** -0.895*** -0.243* -0.923*** -0.894*** 
 (0.139) (0.141) (0.130) (0.148) (0.141) 
Population Density -0.001 -0.001 -0.025 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.004) 
GDP per capita 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.100*** 0.107*** 0.140*** 0.125*** 0.108*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) 
Inflation -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.026* -0.060*** -0.059*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
Capital Formation 0.176*** 0.202*** 0.074 0.210*** 0.211*** 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052) 
Grants -0.620*** -0.667*** -1.159*** -0.759*** -0.681*** 
 (0.151) (0.154) (0.134) (0.164) (0.154) 
Crude Petrol -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.000 -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Government Debt-1 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Corruption 0.015***     
 (0.002)     
Corruption-1  0.015*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Complexity of Tax System   2.386***   
   (0.160)   
Government Fractionalization    -0.009  
    (0.008)  
Population Growth     -0.573* 
     (0.341) 
General Government 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 0.280*** 0.212*** 0.153*** 0.217*** 0.201*** 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.052) (0.059) (0.055) 
      
Observations 1,079 1,039 814 976 1,039 
R-squared 0.843 0.845 0.910 0.844 0.846 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variable: Total Revenues; All 
explanatory variables are in levels. All specifications include regional and period dummies. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Potential Revenues, Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 Half-Normal Exponential 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income Inequality -0.307*** -0.224*** -0.185*** -0.340*** -0.267*** -0.228*** 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.050) (0.041) (0.046) (0.049) 
Globalization 0.313*** 0.199*** 0.225*** 0.320*** 0.211*** 0.237*** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.059) (0.049) (0.058) (0.059) 
Age Dependency -0.048 -0.119* -0.109 -0.076 -0.177*** -0.172** 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.069) (0.061) (0.066) (0.067) 
Agriculture -0.035** -0.050** -0.033* -0.046*** -0.067*** -0.051*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Service 0.042 -0.089 -0.060 0.033 -0.140** -0.111 
 (0.058) (0.069) (0.071) (0.058) (0.068) (0.070) 
Construction -0.131*** -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.142*** -0.122*** -0.128*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) 
Population Density -0.034*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.037*** -0.055*** -0.053*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP Per Capita 0.137*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Education 0.238*** 0.194*** 0.197*** 0.274*** 0.230*** 0.233*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Inflation -8.737 -12.685** -9.953 -5.566 -10.084 -7.183 
 (5.765) (6.281) (6.427) (5.765) (6.316) (6.490) 
Capital Formation 0.171*** 0.093** 0.125*** 0.183*** 0.106** 0.138*** 
 (0.038) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.043) (0.043) 
Grants -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Crude Petrol -0.004* -0.007** -0.005** -0.003 -0.005* -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption  0.130***   0.133***  
  (0.024)   (0.023)  
Corruption-1   0.053***   0.053*** 
   (0.008)   (0.007) 
Gen. Government 0.163*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.154*** 0.114*** 0.123*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) 
Constant -2.061*** -2.273*** -2.180*** -2.083*** -2.361*** -2.270*** 
 (0.141) (0.154) (0.156) (0.136) (0.148) (0.150) 
Observations 1,334 1,094 1,064 1,334 1,094 1,064 
Lambda 1.117 `1.228 1.234 0.748 0.814 0.813 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
Sigma (u) 0.210 0.212 0.213 0.051 0.135 0.135 
 (0.027) (0.231) (0.235) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) 
Log-Likelihood 89.63 133.12 127.45 102.30 148.61 142.30 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variable: Log(total revenues); All 
explanatory variables, except Gen. Government Dummy are in logs; All specifications include regional and period 
dummies. 
 
B.  Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
As we explained above, in our analysis with the stochastic frontier model we assume two 
alternative specifications of the inefficiency term,   . In the first one, the inefficiency term has 
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half-normal distribution and in the second one it has an exponential distribution.
24
 In addition, 
we estimate three specifications for each distribution of the inefficiency term. In the first one, we 
consider corruption as a component of the technical inefficiency so we do not include it in the 
stochastic frontier model; while in the second specification we include corruption as an input. 
Finally, in the third specification, we employ one-year lagged value of corruption rather than the 
current value, to account for the potential reverse causality between revenues and corruption. We 
acknowledge that lagged values may not be the best instrument to resolve the reverse causality 
problem, but until we find a better instrument, we will have to rely on this one. 
 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equation (4) and assuming the two alternative 
distributions of the inefficiency term. As the table shows, results are robust to changes in the 
distribution of the inefficiency term and to changes in the specification. Moreover, the 
coefficients do not even change significantly in magnitude. All the coefficients have the expected 
signs and are mostly statistically significant.  
 
In general, the results in Table 2 support those obtained by the traditional approach with most of 
the coefficients being within a close range of the magnitude. This is comforting in the sense that 
the different econometric estimation strategies do not seem to lead to different interpretations of 
the role played by the determinants of tax performance. 
 
In the two models, the lambda parameter,           , is statistically significant and the log-
likelihood ratio test allows us to reject the null hypothesis that there is no technical inefficiency 
in the model.  
 
 
C. Explaining Inefficiency in the Tax System 
As we have already mentioned above, the stochastic frontier analysis allows us to predict 
technical inefficiency in revenue collection and then investigate its determinants. Table 3 
presents the results obtained by estimating equation (5) when half-normal distribution of 
                                                          
24
 We also try to estimate the model by assuming truncated-normal distribution of the inefficiency term, but we fail 
to do so since the estimation fails to converge. 
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   assumed, and Table 4 presents a corresponding model in the case of the exponential 
distribution of    . Columns 1-4 in Table 3 present the results obtained by estimating the model 
where the dependent variable     is obtained as a predicted value from the model in column 1 in 
Table 2, while in columns 5-8 in Table 3 the dependent variable is the predicted value from the 
model in column 2 in Table 2. Similarly, the dependent variable in the specifications presented in 
columns 1-4 and 5-8 in Table 4 is obtained from column 4 and 5 in Table 2, respectively. In 
other words, when corruption is included in the frontier model, we do not include it in the 
inefficiency equation, and when it is not, we do include it.  
 
As Table 3 shows, the results are quite robust to inclusion/exclusion of corruption, even though 
its estimated coefficient shows the expected sign and it is statistically significant. We also find 
that complexity of the tax system (measured by the Herfindahl index) and government debt are 
especially important components contributing to higher efficiency in the tax system. In the words 
of numbers – one percentage point increase in the complexity of the tax system reduces 
inefficiency by 3.3-4 percentage points. Similarly, one percentage point increase in the previous 
year level of government debt to GDP reduces inefficiency by 3.8-5.3 percentage points. 
Political fractionalization also seems to be a significant factor for tax efficiency – one percentage 
point increase in the probability of two deputies from the government being from different 
parties reduces inefficiency by 1.3-1.5 percentage points. In addition, tax morale seems to have a 
statistically significant effect, even though it is not as large in the magnitude. A surprising result 
is the negative sign on population growth rate which is the opposite from what we expected. A 
possible explanation for this result could be that a rapidly growing population generates pressure 
on the government for meeting their increasing needs for public goods and encourages it to 
collect more revenues to finance them.   
 
 
VI. Comparing the Conventional Tax Effort Indicators and the Expenditure-Revenue 
Gap. 
Finally, we turn to calculating countries’ tax effort indicators and to comparing them to the 
expenditure-revenue gap. Table 5 presents estimates of the tax effort using the stochastic frontier 
method (columns 5-10), the traditional fixed effects model (columns 11-13), and the ratio of total 





Table 3. Explaining Inefficiency in the Tax System.  
Dependent variable: Predicted Inefficiency from the Model Assuming Half-Normal Distribution of Ui 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Corruption -0.502*** -0.105 -0.512*** -0.526***     
 (0.192) (0.218) (0.191) (0.190)     
Complexity of Tax System -3.541*** -3.297*** -3.434*** -3.438*** -3.996*** -3.629*** -3.851*** -3.861*** 
 (0.445) (0.427) (0.447) (0.446) (0.514) (0.505) (0.515) (0.514) 
Tax Morale 0.089*** 0.159*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.078*** 0.150*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Political Fractionalization -1.438** -1.525** -1.485** -1.522** -1.325* -1.349* -1.395* -1.453* 
 (0.661) (0.670) (0.659) (0.656) (0.761) (0.787) (0.758) (0.754) 
Government Debt-1 -4.096*** -3.824*** -4.477*** -4.331*** -4.825*** -4.891*** -5.342*** -5.129*** 
 (0.857) (0.805) (0.876) (0.851) (0.988) (0.955) (1.008) (0.976) 
OECD -0.283 -1.214* -0.494  -0.386 -1.155 -0.680  
 (0.690) (0.641) (0.696)  (0.794) (0.755) (0.800)  
General Government -2.492 -2.015 -1.991 -1.772 -4.423* -3.937* -3.739 -3.439 
 (2.180) (1.969) (2.187) (2.164) (2.525) (2.347) (2.528) (2.503) 
Broad Money  1.630    -1.920   
  (1.513)    (1.694)   
Pop. Growth   -0.802* -0.756*   -1.102** -1.036** 
   (0.418) (0.412)   (0.483) (0.476) 
Constant 44.162*** 30.934*** 42.989*** 42.382*** 47.627*** 38.872*** 45.947*** 45.000*** 
 (4.735) (4.902) (4.757) (4.676) (5.364) (5.664) (5.383) (5.265) 
         
Observations 435 354 435 435 435 354 435 435 
R-squared 0.856 0.889 0.857 0.857 0.843 0.871 0.845 0.845 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Columns 1-4: Dependent variable is technical inefficiency predicted from regression in Column 1, Table 1. Columns 5-8: Dependent 
variable is technical inefficiency predicted from regression in Column 2, Table 1 
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Table 4. Explaining Inefficiency in the Tax System.  
Dependent variable: Predicted Inefficiency from the Model Assuming Exponential Distribution of Ui 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Corruption -0.610*** -0.179 -0.622*** -0.636***     
 (0.207) (0.211) (0.206) (0.204)     
Complexity of Tax System -3.298*** -2.814*** -3.162*** -3.166*** -3.666*** -3.035*** -3.498*** -3.505*** 
 (0.479) (0.414) (0.480) (0.479) (0.550) (0.487) (0.550) (0.549) 
Tax Morale 0.065** 0.153*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.042 0.134*** 0.055* 0.055* 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) 
Political Fractionalization -1.546** -1.381** -1.606** -1.643** -1.624** -1.369* -1.705** -1.748** 
 (0.711) (0.650) (0.708) (0.705) (0.814) (0.758) (0.809) (0.805) 
Government Debt-1 -3.763*** -3.366*** -4.246*** -4.102*** -4.290*** -4.259*** -4.892*** -4.734*** 
 (0.922) (0.781) (0.941) (0.914) (1.057) (0.920) (1.077) (1.042) 
OECD -0.218 -1.312** -0.486  -0.161 -1.093 -0.503  
 (0.742) (0.621) (0.748)  (0.850) (0.728) (0.855)  
General Government -2.959 -2.230 -2.324 -2.109 -4.559* -3.770* -3.763 -3.541 
 (2.346) (1.909) (2.350) (2.324) (2.701) (2.263) (2.701) (2.672) 
Broad Money  1.100    -1.845   
  (1.467)    (1.633)   
Pop. Growth   -1.017** -0.971**   -1.282** -1.233** 
   (0.449) (0.443)   (0.516) (0.508) 
Constant 41.193*** 24.941*** 39.705*** 39.108*** 43.649*** 31.505*** 41.695*** 40.995*** 
 (5.098) (4.752) (5.111) (5.024) (5.737) (5.461) (5.751) (5.621) 
         
Observations 435 354 435 435 435 354 435 435 
R-squared 0.817 0.877 0.819 0.819 0.797 0.854 0.801 0.801 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Columns 1-4: Dependent variable is technical inefficiency predicted from regression in Column 4, Table 1. Columns 5-8: Dependent 
variable is technical inefficiency predicted from regression in Column 5, Table 1 
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Table 5. Estimated Tax Effort by Country 



























1 Albania 2002 - 2004 1 0.78 0.88 0.89 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.68 0.73 0.73 N.A. 
2 Algeria 1994 - 1995 0 1.28 1.31 1.33 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.90 0.92 N.A. 
3 Argentina 2005 - 2006 1 0.99 1.04 1.05 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.90 







5 Australia 2002 - 2004 1 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.66 1.03 
6 Austria 2004 - 2006 1 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.94 
7 Bangladesh 2003 - 2005 0 0.95 1.02 1.08 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.83 
8 Belgium 2003 - 2005 1 1.03 1.04 1.04 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.98 














11 Bolivia 2000 - 2002 1 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.61 
12 Brazil 2003 - 2005 1 1.75 1.69 1.70 1.29 1.24 1.23 1.29 1.24 1.23 N.A. 
13 Bulgaria 2003 - 2005 1 1.03 1.09 1.10 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.95 1.01 
14 Burkina Faso 2001 - 2003 0 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.71 0.72 N.A. 














17 Cameroon 1999 - 2001 0 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.99 0.99 N.A. 
18 Canada 1998 - 2000 1 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.03 0.99 0.96 1.03 0.99 0.96 1.04 







20 Chile 1998 - 2000 1 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.96 
21 China 2001 - 2003 0 0.51 0.56 0.58 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.64 
22 Colombia 2002 - 2004 1 0.98 0.91 0.94 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.99 
23 Costa Rica 2004 - 2006 0 1.11 1.15 1.13 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 0.97 
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Table 5. Estimated Tax Effort by Country (continued) 


































26 Cyprus 2003 - 2005 1 1.02 1.04 1.04 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.67 
27 Denmark 2003 - 2005 1 1.17 1.13 1.13 1.09 1.07 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.05 1.04 
28 Dominican Republic 2004 - 2006 0 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.95 
29 Ecuador 2006 0 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.80 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.76 0.83 
30 Egypt 2002 - 2004 1 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.69 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.76 0.75 0.92 
31 El Salvador 2002 - 2004 0 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.84 







33 Ethiopia 1998 - 2000 0 0.72 0.94 0.95 0.78 0.87 0.90 0.78 0.87 0.90 0.55 
34 Finland 2004 - 2006 1 1.11 1.04 1.05 0.93 0.82 0.81 0.93 0.82 0.81 1.06 
35 France 2004 - 2006 1 1.05 1.10 1.10 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.91 
36 Germany 1997 - 1999 1 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.96 
37 Guatemala 2002 - 2004 0 0.84 0.87 0.80 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.82 
38 Honduras 2004 - 2006 0 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.75 
39 Hungary 2004 - 2006 1 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.73 0.78 0.80 0.73 0.78 0.80 0.84 
40 Iceland 2004 - 2006 1 1.34 1.31 1.33 1.10 1.04 1.03 1.10 1.04 1.03 0.99 
41 India 2003 - 2005 0 1.32 1.34 1.42 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.17 
42 Indonesia 2002 - 2004 0 1.03 1.09 1.13 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.96 
43 Iran 2003 - 2005 1 1.11 1.13 1.14 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.94 
44 Ireland 2003 - 2005 1 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.91 
45 Italy 2003 - 2005 1 1.04 1.09 1.09 0.96 1.00 1.03 0.96 1.00 1.03 0.90 
46 Jamaica 2003 - 2004 0 1.56 1.81 1.79 1.49 1.67 1.64 1.49 1.67 1.64 0.88 
47 Japan 2006 - 2008 1 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 
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Table 5. Estimated Tax Effort by Country (continued) 



























49 Korea, Rep. 2006 - 2008 1 1.01 1.06 1.06 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.96 





















53 Luxembourg 2005 - 2006 1 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.64 1.01 
54 Madagascar 2000 - 2001 0 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.89 
55 Malaysia 2006 - 2008 0 0.85 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.75 N.A. 







57 Mali 1999 - 2001 0 0.71 0.84 0.86 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.72 0.75 0.77 N.A. 
58 Mexico 2003 - 2005 0 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.95 







60 Mongolia 2006 - 2008 1 1.29 1.30 1.28 1.02 0.97 0.96 1.02 0.97 0.96 1.00 
61 Morocco 1997 - 1999 0 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.02 1.04 1.05 0.94 
62 Namibia 1993 0 1.50 1.31 1.44 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 N.A. 







64 Netherlands 2004 - 2006 1 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.98 
65 New Zealand 2002 - 2004 1 1.04 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.91 1.09 
66 Nicaragua 2003 - 2005 0 1.41 1.39 1.40 1.25 1.23 1.23 1.25 1.23 1.23 0.73 
67 Norway 2004 - 2006 1 1.18 1.15 1.15 0.92 0.82 0.82 0.92 0.82 0.82 1.09 
68 Pakistan 1997 - 1999 0 0.97 0.91 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.67 
69 Panama 1998 - 2000 0 0.83 0.99 1.00 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.74 
70 Paraguay 2003 - 2005 0 0.93 1.15 1.16 0.69 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.71 0.71 
71 Peru 2003 - 2005 0 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.94 
72 Philippines 2001 - 2003 0 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.78 
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Table 5. Estimated Tax Effort by Country (continued) 



























73 Poland 2003 - 2005 1 0.95 1.01 1.03 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.86 
74 Portugal 2003 - 2005 1 0.98 1.00 1.01 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.81 
75 Romania 2004 - 2006 1 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.99 







77 Singapore 1997 - 1999 1 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.82 0.83 1.07 
78 Slovak Republic 1996 - 1997 1 0.98 1.03 1.02 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.86 







80 South Africa 1985 - 1987 1 0.93 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.94 
81 Spain 2003 - 2005 1 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.97 
82 Sri Lanka 2000 - 2002 0 0.93 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.70 0.69 0.76 0.70 0.69 0.59 
83 Sweden 2003 - 2005 1 1.12 1.09 1.08 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.90 0.83 0.83 1.01 
84 Switzerland 2000 - 2002 1 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.94 
85 Thailand 2000 - 2002 1 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.85 
86 Tunisia 1998 - 2000 0 1.02 1.08 1.09 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.92 
87 Turkey 1987 - 1989 0 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.92 
88 Uganda 2000 - 2002 0 1.23 1.44 1.46 1.22 1.36 1.38 1.22 1.36 1.38 0.82 
89 United Kingdom 2003 - 2005 1 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.80 0.82 0.92 
90 United States 2002 - 2004 1 1.00 1.02 1.04 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.89 
91 Uruguay 1996 - 1998 0 1.09 1.17 1.18 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.07 0.85 
92 Venezuela, RB 2003 - 2005 0 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.54 
93 Vietnam 2006 - 2008 1 1.55 1.46 1.51 1.49 1.43 1.45 1.49 1.43 1.45 N.A. 
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Table 6. Correlation Coefficients b/w Tax Effort Estimates  
 
   
Stochastic  Traditional Budget 
Balance 
   
Half-Normal Exponential Fixed Effects 
   
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 TR/TE 
Stochastic  
Half-Normal 
Spec 1 1.00                   
Spec 2 0.96 1.00                 
Spec 3 0.96 0.99 1.00               
Exponential 
Spec 1 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00             
Spec 2 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.00           
Spec 3 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.00         
Traditional Fixed Effects 
Spec 1 0.94 0.87 0.86 0.94 0.87 0.86 1.00       
Spec 2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.94 1.00     
Spec 3 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.99 1.00   
Budget Balance TR/TE 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.42 0.31 0.31 1.00 
 
 




revenues and total expenditures (columns 14). The tax effort ratios for the first two 
methodologies are obtained by dividing the actual tax and non-tax collections by the potential 
revenue capacity as defined earlier in each case. As we can see, in most cases tax effort estimates 
from the stochastic frontier method are slightly smaller than those from the traditional fixed 
effects model. We can also see that in most OECD countries the stochastic frontier estimate is 
about 10 percentage points lower than the one from the fixed effects. In part this reflects the fact 
that the benchmark for revenue performance under the stochastic frontier method is the best 
performance in the sample while the benchmark in the traditional approach is the fitted average 
in the sample. 
 
There are alternative ways to further discuss the results. One revealing approach is to focus on 
the different rankings obtained for selected countries. 
 
 An interesting case is Australia with only 69 percent estimated tax effort by frontier analysis, 
which is significantly lower than the estimate from the fixed effects model (about 90 percent) 
and the ratio between total revenues and total expenditures (103 percent). According to these 
numbers we could infer that even though Australia has a much larger capacity to raise revenues 
than in does, it actually raises only the amount that it needs for financing its desired expenditure 
needs. Another interesting example is Burundi for which the estimated tax effort from the 
traditional econometric analysis is between 140 and 150 percent, but they manage to cover only 
76 percent of their expenditure needs from their own revenues.   
 
However, to have a better understanding of these results, it may be more desirable to make 
comparisons between more similar countries. For example, among the industrial nations, when 
we compare Australia with Canada we can conclude that both countries collect enough revenues 
to finance their expenditures, but we estimate that revenue collection in Canada is much closer to 
its potential than it is in Australia. This may be the result of larger expenditure needs in Canada 
than in Australia and, thus, the need for higher collection of revenues. Similarly, we estimate that 
revenue collection in Burundi and Uganda, which are among the poorest countries in the world, 
is well above its potential, but at the same time they are not high enough to finance their 
expenditure needs. On the other hand, Bangladesh and Pakistan are two countries that are so  
34 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
similar but in many ways, including revenue collection, so different. While in both countries the 
level of revenue collection is below their potential and they are below the level needed to fully 
finance their expenditures, the revenue effort measure is much higher in Pakistan than in 
Bangladesh.   
 
These numbers would suggest that for countries like Burundi and Uganda it would be necessary 
to increase their tax capacity through economic and institutional development efforts. Moreover, 
high dependence on foreign aid for financing government spending has a negative effect on 
potential revenue collections. As our results suggest, 1 percent increase in grants from foreign 
governments and international organizations (i.e. foreign aid) leads to a 1 – 1.3 percent reduction 
in potential revenue collections. Countries like Burundi, with relatively low ratios of total 
revenues (tax and non-tax revenues) to GDP of 15.7 percent and relatively high average 
dependence ratios of foreign grants to GDP of 4.8 percent, have space for higher tax effort. Note 
that according to the latest Transparency International (2011) report, the corruption perception 
index in Burundi is 1.9 (10 being the lowest and 0 the highest risk). In addition, it is quite clear 
from our numbers that countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh have space (and need) to increase 
their revenue collections through improved tax administration and enforcement.  
For a more general comparison, Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between the three 
estimates of tax effort. We can see that estimates obtained by the stochastic frontier model and 
the fixed effects traditional model exhibit a high positive correlation indicating that, whereas the 
differences in magnitude may be important, the two methods yield estimates within a close 
neighborhood of each other. The table also shows that each of the estimates from the traditional 
method and the stochastic frontier analysis has a much lower correlation with the tax effort 
measure generated by using total expenditures as a benchmark for potential revenue 
requirements. This result could mean that the tax effort measures generated by different 
econometric methods may not measure up very closely with the revenue requirements in a 
country, especially if the desired development levels achieved by a country or pursued by its 
policies are better approximated by its level of public expenditures. Connecting this with the 
question of how much revenue it needs to raise, given its preferred level of public goods, 
provides a more tractable avenue for tax policy discussions. The low correlation between the tax 
effort measures calculated by econometric methods and our third method also point toward a 




need to carry out further work in developing cogent measures of revenue requirements. Such 
measures could either be built as sustainability requirements for the current level of development 
or serve as lights on the path to achieving higher levels of development. As we mentioned earlier 
in Section 2, despite some good beginnings, much work remains to be accomplished in this area.  
 
In general, according to our results, for most countries in our sample, actual revenue collections 
do not match their revenue potential. There are different reasons for such a result. Some 
countries (e.g. Australia) do not tax up to their full capacity because they do not need to, while 
some others (e.g. Burundi) tax much over the capacity but still have to rely on foreign aid and 
grants to finance much of their expenditure needs.  
 
 
VII. Conclusion  
Calculating tax effort accurately for tax policy purposes and motivating discussion on the scope 
of tax reforms remains an important endeavor. In such efforts, the tax collections are known with 
relative accuracy. A plausible measure of tax capacity that appeals to the policy sense of decision 
makers is a harder task but still key to defining the potential tax gap for any country. The 
traditional approach to measuring tax effort develops a measure of tax capacity that arises out of 
the tax levels attained in other countries and the effects of tax handles and other determinants on 
those tax levels prevailing in the international experience. Adding institutional determinants 
refines this measure but it does not change in any substantial way.  
Similarly, the stochastic frontier approach modifies the measure of tax capacity and parses out 
the production frontier and the implied time varying inefficiency. This provides an additional 
dimension for policy discussions by identifying determinants of and factors influencing 
inefficiency. The tax capacity measure produced with either approach, however, does not 
provide a tangible revenue target specifically applicable to a country. In either case, a weakness 
persists in that the tax gap does not have a close correspondence to the revenue needs given the 
development level to be sustained or achieved. In this paper we have argued that the public 
expenditure level revealed as a political choice in a country may serve as an additional 
informative measure to quantify tax effort. It serves as a readily visible preference for the desired 
level of public goods and service provision in a country. Observed over time, it shows what a 
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country wishes to spend on public goods. This is a useful and politically cogent fiscal indicator 
to assess the adequacy of the level of taxation in a country.  
Linking tax collection to a country’s expenditure profile has the advantage of bringing the 
politics of financing public goods to the foreground of policy discussions. A country may be able 
to sustain high levels of public expenditure with low tax collections in the short to medium term. 
In individual country cases, this could be made possible either due to international aid policies or 
country specific ability to borrow. Over the long run, however, the question of raising revenues 
that correspond with the desired level of expenditures cannot be skirted by policy makers. The 
traditional approaches to measuring tax effort have some technical advantages including the fact 
that country cases are related to the international trends in taxation. However, even when these 
are considered, the political forces may not be moved by them. On the other hand, when tax and 
expenditure choices are seen as linked together and policy makers face the choice of either 
scaling down expenditures (politically unpopular) or increasing taxes (politically unpalatable), 
the tradeoffs for development become much more apparent and may motivate appropriate 
decisions toward timely tax reform.  
It is within this ambit that the search for a counterfactual measure of tax capacity should pay 
attention to regional comparators. Compared with relatively opaque international averages, 
regional comparisons may evoke more intuitive responses. In this regard, additional measures of 
public expenditure could be developed to serve as indicators of either desired or recommended 
revenue requirements for a country, such as those in the Millennium Development Goals . 
Regional expenditures per capita on basic services like education, health and water and sanitation 
can provide a measure which indicates critical revenue requirements for keeping a country on the 
path of development. These critical expenditures may be low in a country, due to political 
priorities or high, due to inefficient expenditure management and service production systems. 
Using regional averages will help diminish such effects via some form of benchmarking 
competition. Another approach could be to develop regionally applicable measures of efficient 
expenditures to provide a set of basic services. Such measures will compare the cost of 
delivering services in comparable circumstances and may present convincing targets for 
enhancing tax effort.  




Finally, a look at the development commitments may provide another measure of revenue 
requirement or desired fiscal capacity. Under several international commitments like health 
commitments and Millennium Development Goals, developing countries bind themselves to 
pursuing specific outcomes. The financial implications of these commitments are easy to work 
out. This could be done in absolute terms per country to find out the fiscal cost of reaching a 
particular development indicator or in comparative terms by alluding to regional comparators 
and referring to the levels of public expenditure reached to achieve particular development ends. 
Tax effort could then be defined with reference to committed public expenditures and used per se 
to provide specific policy guidance for tax reform. We aim to use such data and refined measures 
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Appendix Table A.1. Variables, Description, and Sources 
Total Revenues = Tax Revenues + Non-Tax Revenues 
IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenues 
Database, CEPAL 
Age Dependency Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) WDI 
Agriculture Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing (GDP Value Added in current Prices, %) United Nations Statistics Division 
Broad Money Broad money (% of GDP) WDI 
Capital Formation 
Gross fixed capital formation (including Acquisitions less disposals of valuables)(GDP 
Value Added in current Prices, %)  United Nations Statistics Division 
Complexity of Tax 
System 
= Personal Income Tax^2+Corporate Income Tax^2+General Tax on Goods and 
Services^2+Excises^2+Customs Duties^2 
IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenues 
Database, CEPAL 
Construction Construction (GDP Value Added in current Prices, %) United Nations Statistics Division 
Corruption Assessment of Corruption within the political system (max. points 6) ICRG 
Crude Petrol Production of Crude Oil, NGPL, and Other Liquids (Thousand Barrels Per Day) US Energy Information Administration 
Education Education index UNDP Human Development Report 
GDP Per Capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) WDI 
General 
Government =1 if revenue data at the general government level 
 
Globalization Globalization index 
Dreher, Axel (2006). Does Globalization 
Affect Growth? Evidence from a new 
Index of Globalization, Applied 
Economics 38, 10: 1091-1110. and 
Dreher, Axel, Noel Gaston and Pim 
Martens (2008), Measuring 
Globalisation – Gauging its 
Consequences (New York: Springer).  
Grants Grants from foreign government and international organizations, % of GDP IMF GFS Database 
Income Inequality Gini coefficient UNWIDER 
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI 
OECD =1 if OECD member country 
 
Political 
Fractionalization Fractionalization Index 
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto 
Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 
2001. "New tools in comparative 




political economy: The Database of 
Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 
(September), World Bank Economic 
Review. 
Pop. Growth Population growth (annual %) WDI 
Population Density Population density (people per sq. km of land area) WDI 
Government Debt-1 
General Government  debt (% of nominal GDP). It does not include debt of public 
corporations Historical Public Debt Database 2011 
Service Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) WDI 
Tax Morale Percent of population declaring cheating on taxes as never justifiable World Value Survey 
Years in Office Chief Executive Years in Office 
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto 
Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 
2001. "New tools in comparative 
political economy: The Database of 
Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 
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Appendix Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Age Dependency 6211 0.70 0.20 0.17 1.20 
Agriculture 5793 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.81 
Broad Money 4743 0.44 0.34 0.04 3.24 
Capital Formation 5834 0.22 0.08 0.01 0.68 
Complexity of the Tax System 2670 1.08 1.15 0.01 8.29 
Construction 5834 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.28 
Corruption 2760 3.17 1.39 0.00 6.17 
Crude Petrol 4472 0.34 1.10 0.00 10.64 
Education 3243 0.75 0.21 0.09 0.99 
GDP per capita 4434 10.59 12.40 0.25 123.26 
Globalization 5479 0.47 0.18 0.10 0.93 
Government Debt 4895 0.56 0.52 0.00 20.93 
Grants 3736 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.30 
Income Inequality 2646 0.38 0.10 0.18 0.74 
Inflation 5289 0.11 0.14 -0.29 1.00 
Political Fractionalization 4059 0.21 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Population Density 6272 0.26 1.22 0.00 19.43 
Services 4925 0.52 0.14 0.07 0.93 
Tax Morale 957 0.60 0.13 0.26 0.95 
Total Revenues 3737 0.26 0.13 0.01 0.61 
Years in Office 4892 7.05 7.25 1.00 46.00 
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